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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
MATTHEW JAMES MONTGOMERY, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
 
          NO. 42842 
 
          Bannock County Case No.  
          CR-2010-6467 
 
           
          RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
 
     
      Issue 
Has Montgomery failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion, 
either by relinquishing jurisdiction, or by denying his Rule 35 motion for a reduction of 
sentence and the subsequent motion for reconsideration of the denial of his Rule 35 
motion? 
 
 
Montgomery Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing 
Discretion 
 
 Montgomery pled guilty to criminal possession of a financial transaction card and 
the district court withheld judgment and placed Montgomery on supervised probation for 
five years.  (R., pp.129-34.)  After Montgomery violated his probation, the district court 
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revoked the withheld judgment, imposed a unified sentence of five years, with two years 
fixed, suspended the sentence, and again placed Montgomery on supervised probation 
for five years.  (R., pp.145-54.)  Montgomery subsequently violated his probation a 
second time, and the district court continued him on supervised probation for five years.  
(R., pp.167-71.)  After Montgomery violated his probation a third time, the district court 
revoked probation, ordered the underlying sentence executed, and retained jurisdiction.  
(R., pp.184-91.)  Following the period of retained jurisdiction, the district court 
relinquished jurisdiction.  (R., pp.192-95.)  Montgomery filed a notice of appeal timely 
from the district court’s order relinquishing jurisdiction.  (R., pp.200-03.)  He also filed a 
timely Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence, which the district court denied.  (R., 
pp.198-99; Memorandum Decision Denying Defendant’s Rule 35(A) Motion 
(Augmentation).)  Montgomery subsequently moved for reconsideration of the denial of 
his Rule 35 motion.  (7/13/15 Tr., p.5, Ls.11-25.)  The district court denied 
Montgomery’s motion to reconsider the denial of his Rule 35 motion.  (Memorandum 
Decision Denying Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration (Augmentation).)   
Montgomery asserts that the district court abused its discretion by relinquishing 
jurisdiction in light of his difficult childhood, degenerative disc disease, and mental 
health issues.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.3-4.)  Montgomery has failed to establish an abuse 
of discretion.   
“Probation is a matter left to the sound discretion of the court.”  I.C. § 19-2601(4). 
 The decision to relinquish jurisdiction is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial 
court and will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion.  See 
State v. Hood, 102 Idaho 711, 712, 639 P.2d 9, 10 (1981); State v. Lee, 117 Idaho 203, 
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205-06, 786 P.2d 594, 596-97 (Ct. App. 1990).  A court’s decision to relinquish 
jurisdiction will not be deemed an abuse of discretion if the trial court has sufficient 
information to determine that a suspended sentence and probation would be 
inappropriate under I.C. § 19-2521.  State v. Chapel, 107 Idaho 193, 194, 687 P.2d 583, 
584 (Ct. App. 1984).   
Montgomery has not shown that he was an appropriate candidate for community 
supervision.  He performed abysmally in the retained jurisdiction program, incurring 
numerous disciplinary sanctions and failing to complete any of his assigned 
programming.  (PSI, pp.87-88.1)  Program staff reported: 
Mr. Montgomery demonstrated that if he disagrees with a rule or 
finds the rule unpleasant that he will not follow the rule.  He was given 
numerous Learning Experiences (LEs) to help him get on top of his 
violation of commissary rules.  He would not follow the LEs and actively 
attempted to get some family members to create negative contracts with 
him regarding his commissary violations.  He did not take accountability 
for his choices. 
   
(PSI, p.88), and: 
 Mr. Montgomery has failed to show a real interest in changing his 
thinking or behavior.  He repeatedly violated the TC participant rules, 
failed to complete or adhere to Learning Experiences, and broke the 
coaching contract he agreed to adhere to.  He has not shown the honesty 
needed to work a recovery program at this time.   
 
(PSI, p.92).  NICI reported that Montgomery presents a high risk to reoffend and 
recommended that the district court relinquish jurisdiction, advising: 
 Mr. Montgomery is currently not amenable to treatment.  He 
demonstrates no ability to self-regulate his behavior and isn’t willing to 
follow simple directions on how to learn to self-regulate.  Until such time 
as he is willing to self-regulate his behavior, he will be unsuccessful in 
maintaining sobriety.   
                                            
1 PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file 
“CONFIDENTIAL CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS MONTGOMERY 42842.pdf.”   
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(PSI, pp.86-87, 94.)  The district court considered all of the relevant information and 
reasonably determined that Montgomery was not an appropriate candidate for 
community supervision, particularly in light of his abysmal performance in the retained 
jurisdiction program, high risk to reoffend, and failure to demonstrate any rehabilitative 
progress.  Given any reasonable view of the facts, Montgomery has failed to establish 
an abuse of discretion.   
Montgomery next asserts that the district court abused its discretion by denying 
his Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence in light of his mental health issues and 
medication changes.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.4-5.)  In State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 
203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007), the Idaho Supreme Court observed that a Rule 35 
motion “does not function as an appeal of a sentence.”  The Court noted that where a 
sentence is within statutory limits, a Rule 35 motion is merely a request for leniency, 
which is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  Id.  Thus, “[w]hen presenting a Rule 35 
motion, the defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or 
additional information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the Rule 
35 motion.”  Id.  Absent the presentation of new evidence, “[a]n appeal from the denial 
of a Rule 35 motion cannot be used as a vehicle to review the underlying sentence.”  Id. 
 Accord State v. Adair, 145 Idaho 514, 516, 181 P.3d 440, 442 (2008).   
On appeal, Montgomery acknowledges that he provided “no new or additional 
information” in support of his Rule 35 motion.  (Appellant’s brief, p.5.)  Because 
Montgomery presented no new evidence in support of his Rule 35 motion, he failed to 
demonstrate in the motion that his sentence was excessive.  Having failed to make such 
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a showing, he has failed to establish any basis for reversal of the district court’s order 
denying his Rule 35 motion.   
Finally, Montgomery asserts that the district court abused its discretion by 
denying his motion to reconsider his Rule 35 motion.  (Appellant’s brief, p.5.)  Idaho 
Criminal Rule 35 provides that “no defendant may file more than one motion seeking a 
reduction of sentence under this Rule.”  In State v. Bottens, 137 Idaho 730, 52 P.3d 875 
(Ct. App. 2002), the Idaho Court of Appeals held that “a motion to reconsider the denial 
of a Rule 35 motion is an improper successive motion and is prohibited by Rule 35.  We 
hold that the prohibition of successive motions under Rule 35 is a jurisdictional limit.”   
Montgomery filed his Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence on November 24, 
2014.  (R., p.198.)  The district court denied the motion on May 8, 2015.  (Memorandum 
Decision Denying Defendant’s Rule 35(A) Motion (Augmentation).)  At a hearing held on 
July 13, 2015, Montgomery made an oral motion for reconsideration of the denial of his 
Rule 35 motion.  (7/13/15 Tr., p.5, Ls.11-25.)  The district court denied this second, 
successive Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence on August 20, 2015.  
(Memorandum Decision Denying Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration 
(Augmentation).)  Because the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider 
Montgomery’s successive Rule 35 motion, the district court’s order denying the motion 
must be affirmed.     
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Conclusion 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s orders 
relinquishing jurisdiction, denying Montgomery’s Rule 35 motion for a reduction of 
sentence, and denying Montgomery’s motion for reconsideration of the denial of his 
Rule 35 motion. 
       
 DATED this 25th day of March, 2016. 
 
 
 
      __/s/_Lori A. Fleming___________ 
      LORI A. FLEMING 
      Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
      VICTORIA RUTLEDGE 
      Paralegal 
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